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Abstract 
Research into individual differences in interpersonal accuracy (IPA; the ability to accurately 
judge others’ emotions, intentions, traits, truthfulness, and other social characteristics) has a long 
tradition and represents a growing area of interest in psychology. Measuring IPA has proved 
fruitful for uncovering correlates of this skill. However, despite this tradition and a considerable 
volume of research, very few efforts have been made to look collectively at the nature of the tests 
involved in assessing IPA, leaving questions of the broader structure of IPA unresolved. Is IPA a 
single skill or a clustering of many discrete skills or some combination of partially overlapping 
skills? In a multi-level meta-analysis of 103 published and unpublished participant samples 
(13,683 participants), we analyzed 622 correlations between pairs of IPA tests (135 different IPA 
tests altogether). The overall correlation between IPA tests was r = .19, corrected for the nesting 
of correlations within the studies that administered more than two IPA tests and reported several 
correlations for the same participant sample. Test domain and characteristics were evaluated to 
explain differences in effect sizes; in general, tests in similar domains and using similar 
methodologies were more highly correlated with each other, suggesting that there are domains 
within which individual differences cluster. Implications for future research and IPA 
measurement were discussed. 
Keywords: individual differences, interpersonal accuracy, emotion recognition, lie detection, 
personality judgment, meta-analysis 
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Individual Differences in Interpersonal Accuracy: 
A Multi-level Meta-Analysis to Assess Whether Judging Other People is One Skill or Many 
The ability to make correct inferences about other people’s states and traits is a crucial 
interpersonal skill. In the present article, we use the term interpersonal accuracy (IPA) to 
encompass the entire breadth of ways in which people can be accurate in perceiving others’ 
characteristics based on exposure to their behavior or appearance. IPA is meant to constitute a 
superordinate ability that subsumes specific judgment skills related to emotion, deception, 
personality, and many other transient and enduring characteristics of people. Over the years, 
researchers who are interested in accurate interpersonal perception have used a plethora of terms 
including interpersonal sensitivity (Hall & Bernieri, 2001), which is broad enough to encompass 
considerate social behavior as well as perception accuracy, as well as more specific terms such as 
emotion recognition, which refers to judging discrete emotions (Matsumoto et al., 2000); 
empathic accuracy, which refers to judging another person’s thoughts and feelings during 
spontaneous interaction (Ickes, 2001); judgmental accuracy, which refers generally to 
personality judgment (Funder & Sneed, 1993); and mental states attribution, which refers to 
making judgments about others’ intentions and beliefs (Brüne & Schaub, 2012), among many 
others. Interpersonal perception accuracy, referencing accurate perception of any and all states 
and traits, has been used as a suitable umbrella to subsume many specific terms (Davis & Kraus, 
1997; Hall, Schmid Mast, & West, 2016).  
IPA encompasses a variety of judgment types that differ on dimensions such as the 
content domain, spontaneity of encoded behavior, and the sensory cue channel (Hall, Bernieri, & 
Carney, 2005). Content domains include others’ states (such as emotions or deception), traits 
(such as personality, intelligence, or socioeconomic status), and social characteristics (such as 
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religion, sexual orientation, or kinship). Spontaneity of the behavior that is being judged can 
range from spontaneous (e.g., unrehearsed behavior occurring during a social interaction) to 
deliberate and posed (e.g., prototypical facial expressions posed by actors). A target’s behavior 
and appearance can be presented to the judge (perceiver, decoder) through different cue channels 
or modalities, such as pictures or videos of faces, body postures, gestures, and vocal recordings. 
IPA research can be divided into six broad domains, namely Personality (judging others’ traits), 
Emotion (judging others’ temporary affective states), Situational Affect (inferring what kind of 
situation a person is in), Deception (distinguishing truth from falsehood), Thoughts and Feelings 
(inferring others’ spontaneous thoughts and feelings), and Social Attributes (inferring others’ 
social group membership and social characteristics, e.g., kinship). 
Researchers have measured IPA for a century (e.g., Adams, 1927; Feleky, 1914), looking 
at it from many perspectives. The present article focuses on the individual differences 
perspective—how people differ in their degree of IPA – and aims to analyze how the various 
types of accuracy are related to each other. IPA research is experiencing a dramatic upward 
trend, as evident in the trajectory of PsycINFO entries for the term emotion recognition over the 
last few decades: from 87 in the 1990s, to 680 in the 2000s, to over 2,000 in just the half-decade 
since then. Yet, there has been little progress in understanding the construct of IPA as a whole. 
One reason is that, understandably, researchers in a given discipline have tended to study the 
kind of IPA most relevant to them: personality psychologists have studied accuracy of 
personality judgment (Borkenau & Liebler, 1992; Funder & Colvin, 1988), and social 
psychologists have tended to study more socially defined accuracies such as in judging sexual 
orientation or religion (Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999; Tskhay & Rule, 2013). Similarly, 
emotion researchers have studied accuracy of judging emotions (Ekman et al., 1987; Gendron, 
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Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014), as have many researchers in various branches of 
abnormal psychology who study emotion recognition deficits as a manifestation of emotional or 
developmental dysfunction (Sayla, Vella, Armstrong, Penn, & Twamley, 2013; Uljarevic & 
Hamilton, 2013). Although these research programs have generated many valuable results, they 
have remained largely isolated within their own areas of specialization, meaning that not much 
effort to understand the broader landscape of individual differences in IPA has occurred. 
The present research aimed to produce a more unified picture of IPA by exploring its 
structure as it is captured collectively in the many measuring instruments that have been used. 
We accomplished this goal through a multi-level meta-analysis of studies in which researchers 
administered more than one test of IPA to a group of participants and then correlated the tests 
together. We did not consider the vast number of studies that used one single IPA test, as these 
do not allow examining our question of how IPA tests are correlated. Through examining the 
pattern of correlations among tests in conjunction with information on their characteristics (e.g., 
their content domain and cue channels), the present meta-analysis asked whether, at the 
extremes, IPA is one general skill, meaning different tests of all types would have strong 
convergent validity, or whether there are many independent skills—as many as there are tests to 
measure such skill; or whether there is a middle ground in which some kinds of tests are more 
highly correlated with each other than others. In this case the pattern might reveal a coherent 
structure according to sensible dimensions. The latter possibility could show (for illustration) 
that skill in judging emotion might be unrelated to skill in judging personality, but different tests 
of judging emotion (or personality) might measure the same underlying skill.  
There is good reason to develop a better understanding of IPA as an individual difference 
variable that transcends particular research traditions. IPA is important in all social interactions, 
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from the first encounter with someone to managing a relationship with a close friend, romantic 
partner, colleague, patient, or child. Higher IPA can make social relationships and interactions 
more manageable and predictable, and is adaptive from an evolutionary perspective (Ambady & 
Skowronski, 2008). A wealth of research as well as several meta-analyses point to the adaptive 
value of IPA in workplaces, clinical settings, social life, and psychological adjustment (Hall, 
Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009; Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007; Hall et al., 2016). 
Some of these correlates suggest causally antecedent experiences such as family environment 
(Halberstadt, 1986; Hodgins & Koestner, 1993) or training interventions (Blanch-Hartigan, 
Andrzejewski, & Hill, 2012), and others point to possible causal consequences of IPA, such as 
being a more effective clinician (Ruben, 2016), learning more in an interpersonal instruction task 
(Bernieri, 1991), or being a better music teacher (Kurkul, 2007). IPA also informs models of 
interactions such as those involved in cooperation in social dilemmas and exchange theory, by 
allowing an individual to gauge whether or not to invest with or against others (Boone & Buck, 
2003). Finally, IPA has been included in theoretical models of social intelligence (Thorndike, 
1920), interpersonal intelligence (Gardner, 1983), and more recently, emotional intelligence and 
personal intelligence (Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). In these models, 
IPA is considered a basic component that allows having more successful, smooth, and adaptive 
interactions with others. 
Yet, little is known about how different types of IPA are related to each other. In 
describing the many different approaches to measuring IPA, Zebrowitz (2001) used the metaphor 
of seven blind men, each trying to understand the entirety of an elephant by examining the 
specific part in front of them, leading each man to infer different qualities about that singular 
elephant. This lack of coordination has left the broader concept of interpersonal accuracy—the 
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elephant—as a construct with a yet to be defined structure. Authors have long expressed 
curiosity, and sometimes concern, over how IPA tests correlate with each other (Cline & 
Richards, 1960; Crow & Hammond, 1957). Buck (1984) reviewed studies that reported 
correlations among different IPA tasks and noted generally low correlations. For example, the 
correlation between the Communication of Affect Receiving Test (CARAT; Buck, 1976) and the 
Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979) 
was r = .04. Hall (2001) reported similar findings, with the correlations between the PONS and 
the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT; Costanzo & Archer, 1989) being r = .20 and r = .22 in 
two samples, the correlation between the PONS and the CARAT being r = .16, and the 
correlation between the CARAT and the IPT being r = .10. These results present an odd paradox: 
Although these tests all measure accuracy in judging other people and had demonstrated 
predictive validity with social outcomes and other correlates, they seemed to be nearly 
independent from each other. What, then, is being measured with such instruments? In the 
present meta-analysis, several hypotheses regarding the structure of IPA are examined, as 
mentioned above. In the following, we will discuss some reasons that might support each view. 
IPA as a Single Ability 
There are several reasons to assume that IPA can be considered a single global ability. 
First, all IPA measures require paying attention to and processing cues that are emitted by 
another person through physical appearance and/or verbal and nonverbal behavior. The Lens 
Model (Brunswik, 1956) suggests that the mechanism through which the state or trait of a sender 
is encoded and decoded is based on these cues. Across the different IPA domains, there has been 
a systematic effort to isolate the relevant cues in different media that signal the sender’s state or 
trait of interest in different nonverbal channels including the face, voice, and body (DeMeijer, 
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1989; Ekman et al., 1987; Izard, 1994; Rule, Ambady, Adams, & Macrae, 2008; Scherer, 1978). 
Individuals with higher general IPA might be more attentive to all of these cues, developing 
greater sensitivity to variation and nuance. Other researchers have proposed that there exists a 
superordinate set of cues relating to spatiotemporal forms, geometric and temporal patterns that 
underlie cue features in all the nonverbal media (Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977). Recent research has 
shown that sensitivity to these spatiotemporal cues is related to emotion recognition ability 
across several media (Castro & Boone, 2015). Although not yet extended to other IPA domains, 
such sensitivity to spatiotemporal cues may allow the receiver better utilization of a wide range 
of nonverbal cues and offer a global, or at least shared, underlying mechanism.  
IPA as a Collection of Unrelated and Instrument-Specific Skills 
This perspective proposes that each IPA test measures a different skill, and that these 
skills are independent from each other. This view is supported by studies that found very low 
correlations between different IPA tests. It assumes that the main reason is that IPA measures 
differ a lot in their content and tasks, even within one content domain, and that these contents 
and tasks each require independent skills to make an accurate judgment. For example, emotion 
recognition tests use a wide range of stimuli in which someone expresses an emotional state, 
including pictures of facial expressions, voice recordings, images of body postures, video clips 
with or without sound, or combinations of these—and not all types of cues are embedded equally 
in these stimuli. In addition, diagnostic cues for different emotions tend to appear selectively in 
specific channels (App, McIntosh, Reed, & Hertenstein, 2011) rather than globally across 
channels. Thus, a person who is good at judging one type of cues (i.e., static facial expressions) 
but not others (i.e., dynamic vocal expressions) might perform well only in some emotion 
recognition tasks and not in others.  
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Other IPA domains have used a variety of tasks and stimuli as well. Personality 
judgments are based on still pictures of faces with neutral expressions, voice recordings, or video 
clips of target persons doing a variety of things (such as introducing themselves, negotiating, or 
being interviewed for a job), often with the linguistic information maintained in the clips. 
Deception detection tasks have focused on least two different components involved in catching 
the liar: an affective component such as anxiety or guilt, or a cognitive component where the 
would-be liar must manage the complexity of telling a lie that lines up with all the details of the 
truth (DePaulo, LeMay, & Epstein, 1991). Arguably, different IPA tests represent a combination 
of tasks relying on different types of information and might therefore involve quite distinct 
processes. Some tests, such as the IPT (Costanzo & Archer, 1989), were designed to have 
heterogeneous content (e.g., judgments on kinship, competition, or status), in an effort to span a 
wider range of social situations. Heterogeneous content and different cue channels also require 
knowledge about which cues to pay attention to for various types of judgments. Individuals 
might specialize only in some types of content or judgments, leading to lower associations 
between measures that differ in these respects.  
Even within one cue channel, such as the face, different mechanisms might be involved in 
inferring information from someone’s facial features (e.g., thick brows, plump lips) versus his or 
her emotional expressions, which involve muscle movements (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). 
Furthermore, within one cue channel, stimuli differ in the spontaneity of encoded behavior and in 
stimulus dynamism. Spontaneity can range from spontaneous (e.g., unrehearsed behavior 
recorded during a social interaction) to deliberate and posed (e.g., facial expressions posed by 
actors).  
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Each way in which stimuli in IPA tasks can differ might require distinct skills from the 
judge that draw on different types of cognitive processing, such as more superficial and 
automatic processes versus more conscious and resource-consuming processes. These skills 
might be quite independent, thus leading to no specific pattern between the different IPA 
measures even within a content domain. Nevertheless, each of the various tasks and ways to 
measure IPA might still represent a justifiable and valid assessment approach that captures a 
different facet of the broader concept of IPA. Thus, accuracy is comprised of modular units 
based upon discrete skills in an additive process rather than overlapped skills with a shared 
process.  
IPA as a Set of Distinct but Correlated Skills 
This perspective assumes that certain types of IPA tests are substantially correlated with 
each other, but that different types of tests are related to a lower extent. Such types or clusters of 
IPA tests might be defined by similar content (e.g., judging deception), similar cue modalities, or 
similar types of cue processing more generally. Each type might require similar cognitive 
decision-making processes, whereas different types of tests or methodologies might have less in 
common. From this perspective, IPA would be a multi-faceted, hierarchical construct in which 
all IPA clusters or facets share some variance due to a global IPA skill, but in which connections 
between clusters vary according to how many features the respective tests have in common. 
Several distinctions on the level of features and cue processing can be made between IPA tasks. 
First, interpersonal judgments can refer to others’ transient states (such as emotions or deception) 
and others’ more enduring qualities (such as personality, intelligence, social status, or age). In 
addition, judgments can be about continuous evaluations (How extraverted is the person?), 
categorical choices (Which out of five emotions did the person express?), or dichotomous 
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decisions (Did this person tell the truth or not?). Interpersonal judgments also differ in how the 
stimuli are presented, (e.g., static photographs vs. dynamic video, posed vs. spontaneous 
expressions). Each of these methodologies might represent a type of IPA within which tests are 
more highly correlated.  
In addition, the different types of judgments might also be influenced by different 
individual characteristics, traits, and self-perceptions of the judge. For example, it would be 
plausible to assume that a strong belief in justice or certain occupational requirements might 
motivate someone to be more focused on being an accurate judge of deception and more likely to 
acquire that skill over time, but not as motivated in judging social attributes. Similarly, it might 
be that people who rate themselves as high on emotional intelligence would be better at 
recognizing others’ emotions, but not at evaluating others’ extraversion. Or, people who work on 
a suicide hotline might become very skilled in reading vocal cues, but have only average skill in 
reading cues in other channels. Indirect support for this model of IPA comes from research on 
how other variables are related to IPA, across different ways of measuring it. Gender differences 
have been particularly well researched in this regard, with several meta-analyses available. If 
IPA were one global, homogeneous skill one might expect gender differences to be consistent 
regardless of how IPA was defined in a given test. However, gender differences are inconsistent, 
with women having more accuracy than men for judging emotions (e.g., Thompson & Voyer, 
2014) and for judging personality (Hall, Gunnery, & Horgan, 2016; Vogt & Colvin, 2003), but 
no gender difference is evident for distinguishing between truth-telling and lying (Aamodt & 
Custer, 2006).  
The Present Meta-Analysis  
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To summarize, there are a number of arguments for each of the three possible 
perspectives on the structure of IPA. The present meta-analysis aimed to determine which 
perspective has the most empirical support by examining the magnitude and pattern of 
correlations between different IPA tests. It includes all the studies we could locate, published and 
unpublished, in which two or more different tests of IPA were administered and correlated with 
each other. In addition to establishing the overall correlation between all IPA tests, we also 
investigated whether the magnitude of these correlations varied depending on characteristics of 
the IPA tests as well as on features of the specific study and sample. For each IPA test, the 
content domain it covered was coded, as well as the cue channels, whether stimuli were 
presented in a static or dynamic mode, whether the stimuli had been created from posed or 
spontaneous expressions, which response format it used, and whether the test was a standard IPA 
measure or not. These variables allowed investigating whether there are types of IPA tests and 
methodologies within which people’s levels of accuracy are more highly correlated. Other 
variables that were examined as potential moderators of the association between IPA tests 
include the internal consistency of each test, year and publication status of the original study, and 
sample characteristics (e.g., gender composition).  
Method 
Search 
 To find studies that administered two or more IPA tests, several search methods were 
used. PsycINFO was searched for names of authors known to conduct IPA research, as well as 
for names of commonly used tests. The terms interpersonal accuracy, nonverbal sensitivity, 
nonverbal decoding, emotion recognition, personality judgment, and other similar terms were 
also searched. For both published studies and dissertations, the abstracts, and also full text when 
necessary, were read to see if two or more tests were used. If, in any study, two or more tests 
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were used but there was no report of the correlation between them, the study’s authors were sent 
a request for the correlation(s). Also, authors were queried if significant methodological 
information was missing. The bibliographies of retrieved works were also examined, and the 
present authors’ own reprint files and data archives were consulted. Individual authors known by 
the present authors to conduct IPA research were emailed with a request for published or 
unpublished studies, and an announcement was sent to the listservs of the Society for Personality 
and Social Psychology and the International Society for Research on Emotions.  
Inclusion Criteria  
 Throughout, the term “participants” refers to the sample of test-takers in the studies 
retrieved for the meta-analysis. To be included, the following criteria needed to be met:  
(1) Reported in English. 
(2) Participants at least 14 years old on average.  
(3) Participant sample size at least 10. 
(4) Two or more tests of IPA were given. The definition of an IPA test was that 
participants viewed and/or listened to recordings or photographs of people and made judgments 
of some state, trait, or personal attribute, and their judgments were scored for accuracy. Scoring 
could be for total accuracy (i.e., all the items on a given test) and/or for subparts (see next section 
for further information on subparts). Studies were excluded if they were based on live dyadic 
interaction in which, for example, one member of a dyad made judgments of a partner’s states or 
traits and these were scored for accuracy against criteria supplied by the partner (e.g., emotions). 
This exclusion was done because studies with this design are typically confounded to an 
unknown degree by unmeasured variation in the partner’s accuracy of expressing their state or 
trait (cf. Hall, Schmid Mast, & Latu, 2015), a problem not present when groups of participants 
make judgments of a common set of target persons (stimuli).  
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(5) The original author correlated the tests with each other (or we were able to obtain 
such correlations; see above).  
As stated above, for any given sample of participants, the author may have reported 
correlations for a total score and/or for subparts (i.e., subsets of items). All of these were allowed 
for inclusion, with four exceptions: (1) Correlations between accuracies for judging individual 
emotions or affective states within a test or between tests (e.g., anger correlated with surprise, 
joy correlated with disgust) were not included in order not to flood the database with inter-
emotion accuracies. How accuracies for judging different specific emotions correlate with each 
other is undoubtedly an important research question, but one that exceeds the boundaries of the 
present project and that has been addressed elsewhere (e.g., Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 
2012). (2) Correlations between a test total and subparts of the same test (i.e., part-whole 
correlations) were not included because item overlap would greatly inflate the correlations. (3) 
For the same reason, correlations between subparts of the same test were not included when 
participants could familiarize themselves with the stimuli (and the likely correct answers) due to 
exposure to the same stimuli in overlapping stimulus modalities; for example, the correlation 
between accuracy in judging the Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test’s (MERT’s; Bänziger, 
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2009) still pictures of facial expressions and accuracy at judging the 
MERT’s video clips from which those still pictures were taken was not included because 
participants could learn about one from the other, thus inflating the correlation between the two 
accuracies. (4) If, within the same sample for a given test, correlations with other test(s) were 
reported for both the first test’s total score and its subtest scores (e.g., PONS total score 
correlated with other tests and, in the same study, PONS face, body, and voice scores also 
correlated with the same other tests), only the effect sizes involving subtest scores were included 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN INTERPERSONAL ACCURACY     15 
in the database. The respective total test score correlations were excluded to avoid multiple 
representations of the same data from which subtest and total scores had been calculated. Effect 
sizes based on subtest scores rather than total scores were chosen because this increased the 
variety in test characteristics such as cue channels and content domains in the database. (See a 
later section for a comparison of those excluded total scores’ effect sizes to their respective 
subtests’ effect sizes.) In reviewing studies for possible inclusion, we did not keep a record of 
how many were excluded according to specific exclusion criteria. However, by far the greatest 
number were excluded because they did not administer more than one IPA test; indeed, this was 
the rule and the exceptions were those relatively few that did include more than one test. 
Final Database 
All effect sizes were the Pearson correlation (r) between two IPA tests for a given sample 
of participants. We would have allowed cases where the relation between two tests might have 
been expressed as a partial correlation or a standardized regression coefficient, but none were 
identified. A given sample of participants would produce multiple effect sizes if more than two 
IPA tests, assuming the author reported their respective pairwise correlations. A given source 
(e.g., an article) could yield results for more than one independent sample of participants.  
The database consisted of 83 sources containing 103 independent samples. In turn, those 
103 samples yielded 622 effect sizes.    
Coding of Source and Sample Characteristics 
The descriptive statistics for these characteristics are provided in Table 1.  
Year. This was the year of publication for a book or article, or the year provided by the 
author for unpublished results. 
Publication status. The categories were: journal article, thesis/dissertation, book, 
unpublished, and “published plus,” which meant that the original author provided between-test 
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correlations that were not included in the publication. Unpublished results that were published 
subsequent to retrieval were maintained as “unpublished” in the analysis, but the published 
citation to the work is given in the Reference section if it was known.  
 Size of participant sample on which the effect size was based. 
 Mean age of participant sample. 
 Percentage of females in participant sample. 
 Sample ethnicity. The categories were: more than 60% White, more than 60% Black, 
more than 60% Hispanic, more than 60% other minority, multiple groups with none exceeding 
60%, and multiple groups with no information on the proportions. 
 Number of nested effect sizes. For each sample it was noted how many effect sizes were 
based on that sample, that is, nested within it. This variable was used to implement the nesting of 
effects within studies in multi-level analyses (see Statistical Analysis).  
Coding of Test Characteristics  
The descriptive statistics for these characteristics are provided in Table 2. 
Content domain. This variable captured the state, trait, or attribute that participants were 
asked to judge. The categories were: emotion, judged either on a dimension (e.g., rate how happy 
the face is) or as a categorical choice (choose which emotion the face is expressing, from a 
multiple choice); thoughts and feelings, defined as in the empathic accuracy paradigm (Ickes, 
2001), in which perceivers watch a person’s spontaneous interpersonal behavior on video and 
guess what the person was thinking or feeling during or at the end of the clip, with the accuracy 
criterion being what the target person reported after viewing their own video (note, in keeping 
with the exclusion criteria, live dyadic studies using this paradigm were not included); 
situational affect, meaning participants selected what situation the target person was in, for 
example ordering food in a restaurant versus talking about her divorce; deception, defined as 
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whether target person was dissembling or telling the truth; social attributes, consisting of 
categorical variables describing (relatively) static social or group distinctions such as political 
allegiances or sexual orientation; and personality traits, for example conscientiousness or 
neuroticism. Table 3 lists specific tests and constructs falling into each of these content domain 
categories. 
Cue channels. The cue channels in the test could include: face; voice quality (meaning 
the voice was audible but only its nonverbal qualities could be discerned, which would be 
accomplished through content masking [e.g., bandpass filtering] or by having targets recite 
ambiguous or meaningless linguistic content while varying intended messages such as different 
emotions); body (arms, legs, and/or torso, but not head); linguistic (coded when participants 
could understand the words the target persons were saying and the words contained potentially 
meaningful content); and eyes (coded only when stimuli consisted of only the eyes). Each of 
these five cue channels was coded as “yes” or “no,” as applicable. Thus, if participants watched 
and listened to a video showing the whole person with the original audio track, the coder would 
check face, voice quality, body, and linguistic. A given test could thus consist solely of one of 
these cue channels, or any combination of them. Because the codes were applied to the test as a 
whole, no distinction was made in terms of what cues were combined within a specific test 
stimulus item. This means, for example, that a test where half the items showed only the face and 
half showed only the body would receive the same coding (face present, body present) as a test 
where all the items showed the whole person, that is, a body with its head attached. 
Stimulus presentation mode. The stimulus material in the test could be: static (i.e., 
photographs); dynamic (films, videos, or vocal tracks); or both. 
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Stimulus creation mode. This coding variable consisted of: posed (expressions or 
behavior deliberately enacted for purposes of stimulus creation); spontaneous (expressions or 
behavior recorded under relatively unconstrained conditions, such as a “get acquainted” 
conversation, or during task performance when the target person was unaware of being 
observed); and physical appearance only.1 This variable was not coded for studies on lie-
detection accuracy because it was too ambiguous. The behavior of target persons telling the truth 
could be spontaneous (i.e., actually occurring, unscripted) but might also be posed in the sense 
that they are deliberately trying to seem honest. On the other hand, target persons who are lying 
might be posing (by trying to look honest), or they might be spontaneously behaving as they do 
when they lie. 
Response format. Participants could respond to the stimuli in one of three ways: forced 
choice (i.e., multiple choice answer options); dimensional ratings (e.g., rating of how angry a 
face seemed), or open response (participants could write a free narrative of what they thought the 
answer was).  
Standard test. Tests were classified as standard or not standard, where standard was 
defined as a named test that was used repeatedly in the literature and/or for which the developer 
had published at least one validity article. Variants, shortened versions, and subparts of such tests 
were equally considered standard. Authors of standard tests were likely to have explicitly 
addressed issues of reliability and validity and to have published normative data. Non-standard 
tests were, by contrast, typically developed for a particular study and were not known to be used 
by other investigators much, if at all. Although standard and non-standard tests were generally 
similar in their content and structure, the comparison of standard to non-standard was considered 
important because of the possibility that standard tests would be psychometrically superior and 
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therefore would have the capacity to correlate more strongly with other tests. Table 1 identifies 
tests classified as standard. 
 Reliability. Internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha or equivalent) for the given sample 
was recorded whenever authors provided it, and as an additional contributor to psychometric 
characteristics, number of test stimuli was also recorded.  
Coder Accuracy 
The authors each coded a subset of the studies. Accuracy of coding was confirmed in 
several ways. First, coding of sample characteristics was straightforward, as the information 
(e.g., sample size) was reported directly. Second, coding of test characteristics was confirmed by 
using templates for the most commonly occurring instruments (e.g., the full PONS test of 
Rosenthal et al., 1979, or the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy [DANVA-2] Adult 
Faces test of Nowicki & Duke, 1994). Also, the authors performed many cross-checks of each 
other's coding on a study-by-study basis and also within the database by internal checks to 
confirm that similar tests were coded in the same way. Third, calculation of effect sizes was 
never required, as correlations were provided directly by the original authors in their published 
works or in their personal communications about unpublished results.  
Statistical Analysis 
All analyses were conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics Version 22 (IBM Corp., 2013). 
To account for the nesting of effect sizes within samples, the data were analyzed using 
multi-level modeling (MLM) with sample number as the random effects nesting variable. MLM 
has been proposed as a suitable framework for meta-analysis especially when effect size 
estimates are nested within studies and the number of effect sizes varies considerably between 
studies, as is the case here (e.g., Hox & De Leeuw, 2003; Konstantopoulos, 2011). There are 
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several published meta-analyses that used MLM to account for nesting (e.g., Acar & Sen, 2013; 
Allen, Chen, Willson, Hughes, 2009; Thompson & Voyer, 2014). Treating study or sample as a 
random effect in a mixed model takes into account two sources of sampling error – within 
studies and between studies – when estimating effect size. This analysis is analogous to a 
classical random effects meta-analysis, but additionally takes into account the possibility that 
effect sizes within one study are more similar than effect sizes across studies (Hox & De Leeuw, 
2003). The random effects approach was chosen because we assumed that the “true” effect size 
could vary from study to study due to factors such as the reliability or nature of the specific tests 
or sample characteristics.  
The dependent variable in all analyses was the Pearson correlation between a given pair 
of tests transformed into Fisher’s z (k = 622 effect sizes altogether). The Fisher-z transformation 
normalizes values on the correlation scale. Effect sizes were transformed back to the r-metric for 
all data presentations. To assess the overall association between IPA tests, an unconditional 
means model with effect size as the dependent variable and no predictors was computed. For 
comparison, the average effect size without nesting was also computed. The estimation of 
random effects used the default “variance components” covariance structure in SPSS that assigns 
a scaled identity matrix to each specified effect. The degrees of freedom were estimated using 
the Satterthwaite correction, which approximates degrees of freedom when there are unequal 
variances and group sizes and yields fractional values.  
To assess the moderating influence of test and sample characteristics on effect size, each 
potential moderator was separately added as a fixed effect to the unconditional means model 
(i.e., yielding random intercept models). Random-intercept models were chosen because the 
primary goal was to assess the effect of the different moderator variables on the average 
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correlation between two IPA tests (i.e., how the intercept varies as a function of each moderator 
variable), and to get an estimate of the correlation at each level of the target moderator. Random 
slopes that assess to what extent a moderator’s effect varies between studies were not analyzed in 
these models as this question was not of immediate relevance for our goal. Further, slope 
parameters would be difficult to interpret for most (categorical) moderator variables in the 
present meta-analysis. Two types of moderators were analyzed.  
Level 1 moderators. These varied on the effect size level and consisted of the following: 
Content domain combination of the two tests, cue channel combination, test type combination 
(standard or not), stimulus creation mode combination, stimulus presentation mode combination, 
and response format combination (all of these combination variables were categorical); and 
average reliability and average number of stimuli in the two tests (both variables were 
continuous). By “combination” we mean new variables that were constructed to describe 
similarity or difference between the two tests on the given characteristic. For instance, the 
combination variable for test type had the values “both tests standard,” “one test standard, one 
test non-standard,” and “both tests non-standard.” The two continuous moderators were 
standardized prior to the analysis at the effect size level.  
Due to the nature of the meta-analytic data, not all combinations of all the Level 1 
moderators were available and the ones that were available often showed systematic overlap (i.e., 
domain and cue channel were not orthogonal). As such, and given the exploratory nature of this 
project, each Level 1 moderator was analyzed in a separate multi-level analysis.  
Level 2 moderators. These varied on the sample level and consisted of the following: 
publication status, participant sample ethnicity (both categorical), publication year, percentage of 
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female participants, and mean age of participant sample (all continuous). Continuous moderators 
were standardized prior to the analysis at the sample level.  
The effect of categorical moderators on effect size was assessed by adding each variable 
separately as a factor to the unconditional means model. The effect of continuous test 
characteristics was assessed by adding these variables separately as covariates to the 
unconditional means model.  
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows how often different IPA tests appeared in the meta-analysis, categorized 
by their content domain and whether they were standard or not. In total there were 135 unique 
tests, 76 of which measured accuracy in judging emotions. Table 2 gives a basic description of 
the 103 samples that provided the 622 effect sizes. Table 3 displays the frequencies of key test 
characteristics separately for each content domain. Table 3 reveals important differences in test 
characteristics according to content domain. For example, although tests of judging emotions and 
situational affect were nearly all based on posed stimuli, all of the personality judgment tests 
were based on spontaneous cues. Implications of the confounding between moderators will be 
discussed at a later point. 
Results 
Overall Correlation between Interpersonal Accuracy (IPA) Tests 
The distribution of the 622 Pearson correlations (effect sizes) is shown in the stem-and-
leaf display in Table 4. Correlations between tests ranged from r = -.43 to r = .85 with a mean 
correlation of r = .12 and a median of .11 (both uncontrolled for nesting). To estimate the global 
effect size controlling for the nesting of the 622 effect sizes within the 103 samples, we ran an 
unconditional means multi-level model without predictors. The average correlation between tests 
accounting for nesting as indicated by the intercept in this model was r = .19 (SE = .02; p < 
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.001). The estimated variance of the intercept was .02 and highly significant (p < .001), 
indicating that the different studies substantially varied in their effect sizes and can be considered 
heterogeneous. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), calculated as the ratio of between 
study variance and total variance, was .43, suggesting that about 19% of the variance in effect 
sizes is explained by the study of origin.  
The remaining sections explore structure within the IPA construct, as embodied in 
empirical correlations between tests, by examining variables that might influence how strongly 
tests are correlated with each other. Each Level 1 moderator was evaluated separately, thus there 
were no overall model statistics to report that included all the Level 1 moderators. The average 
correlation accounting for nesting represents the best measure of the overall effect. 
Content Domain  
In order to evaluate how the similarity or difference in the content domains assessed by 
the two correlated tests influenced effect sizes, we ran a multi-level model with the domain 
combination of the two tests as a Level 1 predictor. With each of the two tests measuring one of 
six content domains, there were 21 possible domain combinations, of which 19 occurred in the 
dataset. Table 5 shows the effect sizes estimated for each domain combination. Correlations were 
positive between all domains with the exception of personality with deception. For 11 of the 19 
domain combinations, the mean effect size was significantly greater than zero. The largest 
correlation (mean r = .38, p < .01) was found when both tests measured accuracy in detecting 
deception (although it was based on only two effect sizes), and the smallest was found when one 
test measured accuracy in judging personality and the other accuracy in detecting deception 
(mean r = -.03, p = .72). The second largest correlation involved both tests measuring accuracy 
in judging emotions (mean r = .29, p < .001).  
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To explore which domain combinations statistically differed from each other, we 
conducted pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni-corrected p-values (p-values were multiplied 
by the number of comparisons; i.e., 19) as part of the multi-level model described above.  The 
only domain combination that had a significantly larger average correlation than other 
combinations was emotion with emotion (meaning both tests measured emotions): The average 
correlation between two tests that both measured accuracy in judging emotions was significantly 
higher than the correlations for the combinations thoughts and feelings with social attributes (p < 
.05), personality with personality (p < .001), social attributes with social attributes (p < .01), 
personality with emotion (p < .001), emotion with social attributes (p < .001), situational affect 
with social attributes (p < .05), and emotion with situational affect (p < .05).  
To further explore how the six content domains compared with respect to the other 
domains, for each of the six domains we ran one multi-level model with a dummy-coded variable 
(1 = effect size involved at least one test measuring this domain, 0 = effect size did not involve 
this domain) as a predictor. Each of these six analyses compared all effects involving one target 
domain against all effects not involving that same target domain. The analysis for personality 
showed that when correlations were based on at least one personality judgment test, they were 
significantly lower than all effect sizes not involving a personality test (p < .01). Similarly, the 
analysis for social attributes showed that when correlations were based on at least one social 
attributes test, they were significantly smaller than all effect sizes not involving social attributes 
(p < .01). When correlations were based on at least one emotion test, they were significantly 
larger than all other effect sizes that did not involve an emotion test (p < .01). For the other 
domains, the differences between effect sizes that did and did not include tests of the respective 
domain were not significant. Overall, the correlational pattern shown in Table 5 suggests that 
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tests of personality and social attributes were less highly correlated with tests of their same 
domain than tests of emotion, deception, or situational affect. Furthermore, situational affect, 
emotion, and deception were the domains that were most closely related. Finally, emotion 
emerged as a central domain, showing the highest correlations with other domains.  
Cue Channels  
In order to evaluate how the cue channel(s) assessed in each test influenced effect sizes, 
we ran a multi-level model with the similarity or difference in the cue channel combination of 
the two tests as a Level 1 predictor. For the individual tests, there were nine different cue channel 
configurations, which yielded 45 possible channel combinations between the two tests. The 29 of 
these possible combinations that occurred in the dataset constituted the categories of the cue 
channel combination predictor variable in the multi-level model. Table 6 shows the effect sizes 
estimated for each cue channel combination. Correlations ranged from r = -.08 (p = .62; for an 
effect size for face with face and voice—that is, a face test correlated with a face and voice test) 
to r = .38 (p = .06; for an effect size for body with eyes), although both combinations occurred 
only one single time in the dataset. Nineteen of the 29 combinations yielded correlations that 
were significantly above zero. Among the most frequently assessed combinations, the highest 
correlations were found for face with face (r = .28, p < .001) and for face, voice, and body with 
face, voice, and body (r = .25, p <. 001). Pairwise comparisons between all cue channel 
combinations with the Bonferroni-corrected p-values revealed that the correlation for face with 
face was significantly higher than the correlation for face, voice, body, and linguistic cues with 
face, voice, body, and linguistic cues (p < .01). No other cue channel combinations significantly 
differed from each other, which is partly related to the rather low frequencies in most 
combinations.  
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To explore further how the nine different channel configurations of the individual tests 
compared with respect to their average correlations, for each of the nine configurations we ran 
one multi-level model with a dummy-coded variable (1 = effect size involved at least one test 
assessing this channel configuration, 0 = effect size did not involve this channel configuration) as 
a predictor. Correlations involving at least one test assessing the face, voice, body, and linguistic 
cues were significantly lower than all other correlations (p < .01). For the other cue channel 
configurations, the differences were not significant. This finding is likely to be related to the fact 
that tests assessing face, voice, body, and linguistic cues mostly tested personality judgment and 
almost never emotion; and personality tests were less correlated with other domains than 
emotion tests. In line with the above-mentioned findings for the personality domain, tests 
assessing face, voice, body, and linguistic cues were also less highly correlated with other tests of 
the same configuration than tests assessing other configurations. Overall, the correlational 
pattern shown in Table 6 suggests that tests assessing two or three channels (unless they assess 
linguistic cues) overall tended to have the highest associations with other tests. 
Test Reliability 
Test reliability (internal consistency for the given sample as measured with Cronbach’s 
α) and the average number of test stimuli of the two tests (which is a contributor to test 
reliability) were significantly positively related with effect size. Information on the reliability of 
both tests was available for only 74 of the 622 effect sizes and for these 74 cases the averaged 
reliability for the two tests ranged from .13 to .92 (mean α = .48, SD = .16). In Table 7, the 
intercept of .23 for the reliability analysis indicates that the correlation between two tests with an 
average mean test reliability (i.e., a combined α of .48) is expected to be r = .23. The estimate of 
.10 means that a one standard deviation change in the combined α of the two tests will lead to an 
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increase or decrease in the correlation between these tests of .10. For example, the correlation 
between two tests with a mean α of one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., .48 + .16= .64) 
would increase by .10 from r = .23 to r = .33.  
Information on the number of stimuli for both tests was available for 610 of the 622 
effect sizes and the average number of stimuli in the two tests ranged from 5 to 236 (M = 29.11, 
SD = 29.34). As above, the intercept of .18 suggests that the average correlation of two tests with 
a mean number of items of 29.11 will be r = .18. The estimate of .03 indicates that the 
correlation between two tests will change by .03 when their mean number of items increases or 
decreases by one standard deviation. That is, two tests with a mean number of items that is one 
standard deviation above the average (i.e., 29.11 + 29.34 = 58.45) would be expected to correlate 
at r = .21 (.18 + .03). Collectively these findings demonstrate that more reliable tests and longer 
tests tend to yield higher effect sizes.  
To explore the implications of this finding further, we conducted an additional analysis 
on a subset of studies for which we were able to retrieve both correlations of total test scores 
(e.g., MERT total score) and the test’s subtest scores (e.g., MERT audio, MERT still pictures, 
and MERT video subtests) with other tests. (Recall from Method that, for this subset, 
correlations of total test scores with other tests were not part of the dataset of k = 622 that was 
used for all analyses reported above.) Comparing correlations involving total test scores (which 
are based on longer and hence presumably more reliable item sets) to correlations involving 
subtest scores (which are based on shorter and presumably less reliable item subsets) allows for 
an additional test of the effects of test reliability on correlations between IPA measures. For nine 
of the samples in the present meta-analysis, both subtest and total score correlations of the same 
test with other measures were available. In these nine samples, there were 223 effect sizes (part 
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of the k = 622 dataset) that involved at least one subtest score of a test for which also total score 
correlations were available, and 58 effect sizes that involved at least one total score of a test for 
which also subtest score correlations were available (not part of the k = 622 dataset). We ran a 
multi-level model with the effect sizes as the dependent variable and the dummy coded variable 
1 = “effect size involved at least one total test score” and 0 = “effect size involved only subtest 
scores” as a factor. The effect of this factor was significant, F(2, 18.727) = 17.761, p < .001, with 
the mean correlation for the 58 effect sizes involving total test scores being significantly higher 
than the mean correlation for the 223 effect sizes involving only subtest scores (.27 versus .20, 
difference significant at p < .01). This indicates that longer tests and full tests rather than 
subparts of tests generally yield higher correlations with other IPA measures, presumably 
through their higher reliability. 
It is known that correlations between tests are restricted in size as a function of the 
amount of error variance in each test (Guilford, 1954). That is, the lower the reliabilities of the 
two tests are, the lower is the upper boundary for the correlation between them. Given that, 
overall, the internal consistencies of IPA tests tend to be low, the overall effect size of r = .19 
that was found in the present meta-analysis might underestimate the relationship between the 
true variances of these tests. In order to explore how much test (un)reliability affected the 
correlations between tests, we corrected the effect sizes for attenuation using the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients of both tests when they were available (Guilford, 1954) and estimated the 
overall effect size in a multi-level model. For the 74 effect sizes where Cronbach’s alpha was 
available for both tests, the overall effect size was r = .26 without correction and r = .40 with 
correction for attenuation.  
Other Moderators  
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Standard test. Whether the two tests were standard or not significantly influenced the 
correlation between two tests; effect sizes were significantly higher when both tests were 
standard (r = .23) than when one test (r = .14) or both tests (r = .13) were non-standard.  
Stimulus presentation mode. Whether stimuli in a test were static (e.g., photos) or 
dynamic (e.g., videos, audio recordings) did not have a significant effect on the correlation 
between two tests.  
Stimulus creation mode. Stimulus creation mode was a significant moderator of effect 
sizes. When both tests used posed stimuli, correlations were significantly stronger (r = .25) than 
when one test (r = .15) or both tests (r = .11) used stimuli showing spontaneous target behavior 
or when both tests were based on physical appearance (r = .09).  
Response format. Response format was significantly associated with the correlation 
between two tests. When both tests used a forced-choice response format, correlations were 
significantly stronger (mean r = .23) than when one test (r = .07) or both tests (r = .08) used 
dimensional rating scales.  
It needs to be pointed out that response format, stimulus creation mode, and test 
standardization were highly confounded with content domain in our dataset. As was seen in 
Table 3, standard tests, posed stimuli, and forced choice response format are prevalent mostly in 
the emotion and situational affect domains that had yielded higher correlations between tests 
than, for example, the personality domain. Due to the low frequency of these features in tests of 
other domains, the effects of study characteristics cannot be disentangled from content domain 
effects.  
Level 2 Moderators: Source and sample characteristics. The effect of publication 
status and ethnic composition on the overall effect size was assessed by adding each of these 
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categorical variables separately as a factor to the unconditional means model. The effect of 
continuous sample characteristics (sample size, percentage of female participants, publication 
year, and mean age) was assessed by adding these variables separately as covariates to the 
unconditional means model, resulting in four multi-level models. The results are presented in 
Table 7. None of the source or sample characteristics significantly affected the correlation 
between two tests.  
Publication Bias  
In the present meta-analysis, nearly half of all effect sizes were obtained from 
unpublished studies or upon request from authors of published studies who had not included the 
relevant results in their publication (see Table 2). Publication status was analyzed as a moderator 
and the effect was not significant (see Table 7), showing that effect sizes of published studies 
were not larger than effect sizes of unpublished studies. As recommended by Hox and De Leeuw 
(2003), we also analyzed sample size as a moderator in order to examine whether large positive 
effect sizes were predominantly found in smaller studies, which could suggest that many 
nonsignificant or negative effects obtained in other small studies might have remained 
unpublished. In our analysis, sample size was unrelated to effect size (see Table 7), speaking 
against this potential bias. In order to assess the number of studies with a zero effect size needed 
to bring the overall unnested mean effect of r = .12 to a trivial magnitude (we chose r = .05), we 
calculated Orwin’s fail-safe N (Orwin, 1983), using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). By this calculation, it would take 795 
additional studies with mean correlation of zero to bring the combined correlation under r = .05. 
In our view, this is an implausible number of unretrieved studies. Furthermore, if they do exist 
they only confirm our overall conclusion that the relation between tests is very small on average. 
Discussion 
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Research on accuracy of interpersonal perception has a very long history (e.g., Buzby, 
1924) and it is currently burgeoning (Hall et al., 2016). There are many traditions within this 
field, and many different kinds of questions that can be asked about interpersonal accuracy 
(IPA). Here, we focused on whether this ability is comprised of one skill or many skills. 
Zebrowitz (2001), discussing various approaches to measuring IPA, likened researchers in this 
field to the blind men who all thought they had touched a different animal because they had 
touched different parts of an elephant. Although there is likely much truth to this analogy, it may 
be equally likely that many IPA researchers are doing the opposite: touching different animals 
while thinking they are touching the same one—in other words, measuring different kinds of IPA 
but assuming they are measuring the same thing. The analyses presented here shed light on 
which interpretation is the more accurate representation of IPA structure, at least as it is revealed 
in the empirical data available to date: Is there, first, one general skill in perceiving others 
regardless of how IPA is measured; second, many discrete and unrelated skills (as many as there 
are instruments to measure skill); or third, a set of correlated skills each of which refers to a 
specific domain or type of interpersonal judgment? We answered this question by examining 
how different IPA tests correlate with each other and what factors might account for differences 
in strength among the various correlations. 
The multi-level meta-analysis demonstrated a modest overall between-tests correlation of 
r = .19 that varied as a function of a number of different moderators. IPA tests within content 
domains were generally more highly related than IPA tests across domains. Some domains, in 
particular emotion recognition, appeared to be more homogeneous than other domains, meaning 
that correlations within this domain were higher than the average between-tests correlation of r = 
.19. Emotion recognition tests also yielded the highest correlations with other domains, whereas 
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personality and social attributes tests yielded the lowest correlations. With respect to cue 
channels, correlations tended to be higher the more nonverbal cue channels (face, voice, and 
body) were contained in the stimuli. Standard tests and similarly constructed tests also showed 
higher correlations, specifically, when both tests used posed stimuli and a forced-choice response 
format.  
Finally, analyses of test length and reliability suggest that the average effect size 
increases if the low internal consistency of many tests is accounted for. When we recalculated 
overall effect size only with data from full tests rather than data from subtests, the overall 
correlation between tests improved significantly from r = .20 to r = .27. Furthermore, in an 
analysis based on correlations that were corrected for unreliability of the two tests, the average 
correlation between tests increased substantially from r = .26 to r = .40, indicating that the true 
association between people’s skills in recognizing various traits, states, and attributes across 
different tests is not trivial, although one must remember that in practice no IPA tests have 
perfect reliability.  
Mapping the Terrain of IPA 
Given the significant positive overall correlation between IPA tests, the possibility that 
IPA is a collection of unrelated and instrument-specific skills can be dismissed. However, the 
overall effect size, even when accounting for test unreliability, was rather modest when 
compared to the strong correlations between tests in other psychological domains such as 
cognitive ability or Big Five personality dimensions (Dodrill, 1981; DeYoung, Quilty, & 
Peterson, 2007). Hence, the possibility that all tests measure the same global ability can be also 
be dismissed.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN INTERPERSONAL ACCURACY     33 
The present pattern most closely supports the hierarchical perspective as described in the 
third theoretical possibility. It suggests a set of domain- and channel-specific skills that are 
connected by a more general IPA (as reflected by the positive overall correlation between 
domains), with each of the tests being connected to the respective domain- and channel-specific 
skills (as reflected by higher correlations among tests of the same domain than among tests of 
different domains). In other words, the structure that emerged from the meta-analysis suggests 
there are kinds of accuracy, not simply different tests, and that these kinds of accuracy are 
connected by a higher-order global IPA skill. Moderator analyses showed that such kinds or 
facets of accuracy can be represented by different content domains as well as certain test 
characteristics. Overall, tests that were similar in content and/or test characteristics were more 
highly correlated with each other. The impact of test similarity on the correlations between tests 
is well illustrated by examining correlations that were particularly strong. Eighteen effect sizes 
were larger than r = .50. For 12 of these (67%), both tests measured emotion judgment; if 
situational affect and thoughts/feelings are added in (they are, in a looser sense, about emotion), 
this figure jumps to 17 out of 18 (94%).  
From a theoretical psychometric perspective, these results are consistent with the “causal 
indicators” model of measuring theoretical constructs proposed by Bollen and Lennox (1991). 
This model proposes that theoretical constructs can only be measured in a comprehensive and 
valid way when all facets that causally determine the construct are assessed, e.g., by different 
tests. Critically, the less these facets or “causal indicators” are correlated, the more unique 
incremental variance they can each add to explaining the global theoretical construct. The 
different facets are therefore not interchangeable, and omitting any of the facets would omit part 
of the overall construct. Bollen and Lennox (1991) contrasted this “causal indicators” model 
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with the conventional “effect indicators” model in which measures of a construct are not seen as 
its potentially independent facets, but as “effects” caused by the construct. In this model, each 
indicator represents a repeated effect or outcome of the same construct and the indicators are 
supposed to be substantially correlated (which is why most test developers hope their test items 
are strongly positively correlated with each other). The results of the present meta-analysis 
suggest that the “causal indicators” approach can appropriately describe the IPA domain: the 
variety of weakly correlated IPA measures across domains and channels captures many different 
facets of global IPA and collectively adds to its construct validity. Tests that measure similar 
content or use similar methodologies can be seen as clusters of causal indicators, among which 
the different tests are still not interchangeable (Bänziger, Scherer, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2011).  
Methodological and Practical Implications 
Although the issue of correlations among IPA tests and whether there is a sensible 
structure to the IPA domain may seem like a question of only methodological or psychometric 
interest, in fact it touches upon a number of important and timely questions facing the 
interpersonal accuracy field. Aside from helping to resolve a long-standing puzzle—brought 
about by previous authors’ observation that tests of IPA do not correlate with each other very 
well (Buck, 1984; Colvin & Bundick, 2001; Hall, 2001)—the present results can help guide 
future research in substantive ways. In the remainder of the discussion, we will address practical 
implications for users and developers of IPA tests, theoretical implications for the understanding 
of mechanisms and processes underlying individual differences in IPA, and directions for future 
research in the IPA field.  
Choosing an IPA measure. The present results clearly showed that IPA tests are not 
interchangeable. Although the average effect size was highly significantly above zero, any two 
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tests plucked at random from all of the 135 tests that were used in the database would share little 
variance with each other. Importantly, low internal consistency only partly accounts for this: 
Even error-free estimated between-test correlations were only of moderate magnitude, meaning 
that different tests (or kinds of tests) would still not be fully interchangeable even if they all had 
perfect reliability.  
However, based on our own close familiarity with the field, we can say with confidence 
that many authors of studies on IPA, including ourselves at times, often give little to no 
justification for their choice of a particular IPA test. Certainly, domain of interest often dictates 
from which subset of tests a researcher is likely to choose. However, beyond that, due to their 
familiarity with (or loyalty to) one test more than others, or convenience (ease of administration 
and scoring, time required), or simple emulation of previous studies, the choice of a content 
domain of IPA, and of a given test within a chosen content domain, often seems arbitrary and 
certainly not explicitly justified either empirically or theoretically. On the one hand, a major 
reason for this is the absence of empirical data and prior theoretical reasoning to guide 
researchers in the choice of domains and tests. On the other hand, a large contributor to the lack 
of guidance in the literature is the fact that, either for pragmatic reasons or oversight, authors 
rarely measure IPA using more than one test. In searching the literature for the present meta-
analysis, only a tiny fraction of all the available studies on IPA used more than one test. This fact 
makes it not only far more difficult to answer questions about the structure of IPA, but also 
retards the development of knowledge about the differential predictive validity of IPA tests and 
the constructs they represent. This latter issue goes far beyond the simple question of how tests 
correlate with each other but depends, in part, on knowing the answer to that question.  
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Predictive validity of different IPA facets. Collectively, there is ample evidence that 
IPA tests have significant predictive validity for a wide range of external variables (for reviews, 
see Davis & Kraus, 1997; Hall et al., 2009, 2016; Rosenthal et al., 1979). However, given the 
current findings that imply only partial overlap across measures of IPA, it is important to know 
whether this predictive validity is a broader aspect of social functioning related to the shared 
accuracy across IPA or is more specific to the domain in which it was tested. This question also 
leads to some other intriguing possibilities in terms of where there may be gaps in the literature 
and in terms of what types/classes of outcomes investigators who wish to compare the 
differential predictive validity of various tests might study. One example of a gap in 
understanding predictive validity can be found in a recent meta-analysis on IPA in relation to 
perceivers’ power, status, and dominance (Hall et al., 2015). Those authors found that so many 
studies measured IPA in terms of affect recognition that content domain could not be examined 
as a moderator.  
As an example of the expansion of knowledge that would result if researchers did 
administer more than one IPA test, consider a researcher who wants to find out what skills are 
most valuable for personnel recruiters to have, in terms of the success of their hiring 
recommendations. Should the recruiters have special skill in judging applicants’ emotions, in 
judging their personality, or in judging whether they are telling the truth or not? Or are all three 
skills equally valuable?  
Psychometric issues. The internal consistency or reliability of all the measures included 
in the present meta-analysis is likely to have played an important role in understanding the nature 
of the shared qualities of IPA. Unfortunately, the analysis was greatly impacted by the under-
reporting of reliability coefficients throughout the literature, which is particularly problematic 
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because the reliabilities that were reported suggested that there was room for concern. For 
studies that did report reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for both tests, the average was .48, a figure 
that falls below conventional standards for good psychometric quality (Schmitt, 1996). Several 
researchers have previously noted that weak internal consistency is a likely reason for low 
correlations between IPA tests (Hall et al., 2005; Kenny, 2013; Davis & Kraus, 1997), given that 
internal consistency sets a boundary for the maximal correlation between two measures due to 
measurement error (Schmitt, 1996).  
Several observations can be made to help researchers think about the issue of internal 
consistency in IPA tests. First, some IPA tests have very good reliability, for example the GERT, 
an emotion recognition test with Cronbach’s alpha around .80 (Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 
2014; Schlegel & Scherer, 2015). It is worth noting that the correlations involving the GERT 
were among the highest effect sizes in the present database. Second, there is ample evidence that 
individual differences in IPA exist, as demonstrated by the many studies showing predictive 
validity such as reviewed elsewhere in this article. Also, re-test reliability—when examined—
has often been good (Hall et al., 2005). Despite previous evidence that individual differences are 
hard to detect for lie detection (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008), the present 
meta-analysis found substantial correlations in the few cases where lie detection tests were 
correlated with each other, suggesting there are individual differences. Lie detection research 
might be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of more than one test of lie detection ability or by 
including other measures of IPA. In particular, tests of emotion recognition paired with lie 
detection in which the lie (or truth) is detected through emotional cues could yield particularly 
compelling results. Regardless, given evidence of predictive validity, re-test reliability, and 
individual differences, perhaps we should not be very concerned with internal consistency. On 
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the other hand, if tests had better internal consistency, validity coefficients would, logically, be 
stronger.  
Third, consistent with the logic of the “causal indicators” model of measurement 
introduced earlier (Bollen & Lennox, 1991), one could argue that a test with weak internal 
consistency in fact gains conceptual strength by measuring several loosely related facets of the 
construct and embracing a wider universe of stimuli (e.g., items tapping into different cue 
channels or content) rather than many tightly linked constructs (e.g., all items in the same 
domain, same cue channel, etc.). Some tests, in fact, have a demonstrated factor structure 
(PONS, analysis in Rosenthal et al., 1979; MERT, analysis in Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 
2012), and some were designed a priori to measure more than one kind of content (IPT; 
Costanzo & Archer, 1989).  
Another important methodology-related finding in the present meta-analysis was that test 
characteristics such as response format and stimulus creation mode were largely specific to 
certain content domains and were not evenly distributed across domains. For example, tests in 
the emotion and situational affect domains mostly used forced choice response formats and 
consisted of stimuli in which the targets had been instructed to pose an emotion or affective state. 
Accordingly, these tests are typically scored by determining whether a judge chose the emotion 
label or affective state that corresponds to what the target had been asked to express. In contrast, 
tests about judgments of others’ personality always used dimensional ratings of targets’ 
spontaneous behavior and are typically scored with respect to the target’s self- or informant-
reported trait level. The current status of the field where the most commonly used tests and 
similar test construction practices are aligned with specific domains of IPA makes it difficult to 
reach a conclusion about whether variations in the degree of correlation between IPA tests were 
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caused by the domain or by test features. Our moderator analysis showed increased correlations 
between tests that both used a forced-choice response format which could simultaneously explain 
the higher correlation between two emotion recognition tests over a test of emotion recognition 
with a personality judgment task or two personality judgment tasks. 
Another aspect that might have interacted with content domain in affecting between-test 
correlations was whether an IPA test was a standard instrument or not. Notably, almost half of 
the individual measurements in the dataset were based on non-standard tests. Standard IPA tests 
generally yielded higher correlations with other tests, but at the same time standard tests mostly 
measured emotion recognition, whereas there was not a single standard test measuring accuracy 
in judging personality. The low intercorrelations of personality judgment tests might or might not 
be partly related to the lack of standardized and potentially better validated tests in this domain.  
As a direction for the psychometric future of the IPA field, it would be desirable to 
develop more standard tests, especially in the personality domain. The development of new tests 
could benefit from modern psychometric methods such as Item Response Theory (IRT; 
Embretson & Reise, 2000) and factor analysis (Brown, 2006). The use of these methods provides 
advanced information about a test’s internal structure and consistency (such as whether the test’s 
structure remains the same across cultures, genders, etc.), which can in turn inform the 
understanding of the IPA construct. It would also be desirable to develop tests that measure 
several domains simultaneously and/ or that include different stimulus channels and item types.  
Development, mechanisms, and determinants of IPA. While the meta-analysis 
definitively shows support for some degree of relationship between the different measures of 
IPA, it does not directly inform about what the shared qualities of IPA might be. Having 
considered whether there is a shared construct that spans IPA, several more questions 
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immediately follow; for example: What are the mechanisms underlying accurate interpersonal 
judgments in the different domains, and what mechanisms and processes are shared between the 
domains? One result of the present analysis was that emotion recognition appeared to play a 
central role among all IPA domains. The processing of affective stimuli might thus be a shared 
feature of some, though perhaps not all, types of interpersonal judgments. This idea is supported 
by a range of neuroscientific studies that identified and compared the brain regions involved in 
different IPA and social cognition tasks (e.g., Heberlein & Saxe, 2005; van Overwalle, 2009). 
Another recent line of research examines embodiment as a mechanism in different types of 
interpersonal judgments (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). 
Embodiment describes the perceptual, somato-visceral, and motoric re-experiencing or 
simulation of a target person’s state or behavior in the observer. Although to date there is no 
agreement yet about the precise nature of the mechanisms involved in making various 
interpersonal judgments, research in fields like neuroscience is likely to contribute to the 
understanding of IPA in the future.  
Finally, yet another set of questions that emerge from this meta-analysis is which factors 
might influence whether people get specialized (or not) in one or another domain or cue channel. 
One variable that is likely to be related to higher overall IPA is general mental ability, including 
indicators of better information processing as well as better crystallized knowledge, for example 
in vocabulary (Murphy & Hall, 2011). With respect to specialization, in looking across the 
different literatures, there is evidence that people can be trained to become more accurate in a 
variety of IPA tasks (Blanch-Hartigan et al., 2012; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). Alternatively, 
some individuals have life experiences that may make them better, as suggested for example by 
research that shows that criminals may be better in lie detection than other groups (Hartwig, 
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Granhag, Strömwall, & Andersson, 2004; Vrij & Semin, 1996). There are also variables that 
could be related to being more accurate in specific cue channels, such as individual differences in 
global versus local processing of visual stimuli (Martin, Slessor, Allen, Phillips, & Darling, 
2012).  
Summary and Outlook 
Early research attempting to identify a global ability of IPA produced lackluster results 
that left some researchers in the field wondering if there was any connection between the various 
tests and measures that have been used to assess IPA. The present meta-analysis represents a 
significant improvement over previous efforts to look for relationships across a large number of 
tests. Results showed that there is shared variance across content domains and that the more 
similar the methodologies and cue channels used in test construction, the higher the degree of 
positive relationship between measures. Also, there was some distinctiveness between the 
various content domains of IPA, suggesting that the various measures of IPA are not 
interchangeable.  
There are also opportunities to explore new domains of interpersonal judgments that have 
not yet been well-connected to other forms of IPA. Such domains might include the accurate 
perception of others’ pain (e. g. Ruben & Hall, 2013), the accurate appraisal of another person’s 
emotion regulation skills (Murphy, 2014), or the ability to make accurate judgments about how 
others perceive oneself (meta-perception accuracy; Carlson & Barranti, 2016). Given the 
expanding interest in IPA, it is hoped that the present meta-analysis will serve as a starting point 
for future efforts to understand and measure this critical component of social competence.  
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Footnotes 
1. We also coded the criterion that the test developer used to determine what the “right” 
and “wrong” answers were on a given test (e.g., instruction that the target received from test 
developer or target’s self-report) and examined effect sizes as a function of similarity between 
tests on the criterion. However, this variable was essentially redundant with stimulus creation 
mode: when stimuli were posed by the target, the “right” answer usually corresponded to the 
instruction the target had received, such as the instruction to pose a certain emotional expression; 
when stimuli were spontaneous, the “right” answer usually corresponded to the target’s self-
report on the variable to be judged. Accuracy criterion is therefore not discussed further.  
 
